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Abstract 
This paper analyzes and assesses the DBRS sovereign credit rating methodology 
and its rating decisions on Portugal. A replicated rating model on Portugal allows 
to assess the DBRS rating methodology and to identify country-specific risk factors. 
An OLS regression compares rating effects of ten fundamental variables among 
S&P, Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and DBRS. Further, a rating scale model fractionally 
disentangles DBRS rating grades into their subjective and objective rating 
components. Both qualitative and empirical findings attest DBRS a comparably 
lenient rating behavior on Portugal –in comparison to other rating agencies as well 
as within the DBRS cross-country rating decisions. 
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1  Introduction 
Sovereign credit ratings exercise strong economic and political influence on a country, 
particularly through its strong market signaling effects.1 Ratings take a significant role in 
determining a country’s (re-) financing conditions on the financial markets. Further, a potential 
credit downgrade can expose a country to limited institutional support - institutional investors 
are legally constrained from buying bonds with ratings below specific rating levels classified 
as “non-investment” status. Instancing, Portugal has been withdrawn the sovereign “investment 
grade” status by all renown rating agencies in the course of the financial crisis -  primarily due 
to high public and private sector indebtedness, weak economic growth and a labile banking 
sector. The rather unknown Canadian rating agency DBRS on the contrary has been holding on 
to attesting Portugal “investment grade” status. The attestation of a sovereign “investment 
grade” by at least one major rating agency acts as the legal prerequisite for the government 
bond buying and refinancing programs of the ECB, and thereby ascribes the DBRS (future) 
sovereign risk assessment of Portugal decisive political and economic influence.2 
This paper has been established in the course of a directed research internship at Banco de 
Investimento Global. The objective of this paper is to qualitatively and empiricaly analyze the 
DBRS sovereign credit rating methodology. Focus is specifically laid on its rating decisions on 
Portugal. The replication of the DBRS sovereign risk model of Portugal serves to identify and 
quantify key risk factors as well as give an assessment on technical specifications. The 
qualitative part assesses cross-agency historical ratings of Portugal and elaborates on general 
differences in rating methodologies among the major rating agencies. The empirical analysis of 
DBRS ratings closely follows the analysis approach by Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis 
(2014). A panel OLS regression allows to compare rating effects of ten best-fitted fundamental 
variables among rating agencies. A rating scale model introduced by Studer and Winkelman 
(2016) fragments DBRS rating grades into their subjective and objective rating components.  
This paper contributes to existent academic literature as well as adds value for active market 
participants. Current literature on sovereign ratings is mostly limited to the rating analysis of 
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. The inclusion of DBRS rating decisions – applied at the case 
of Portugal – therefore allows to undertake a more comprehensive discussion on sovereign 
ratings. Further, an alternative statistical rating model for the purpose of sovereign risk analysis 
                                                          
1 Sovereign credit ratings are defined as long-term foreign-currency issuer ratings throughout this paper. 
2 The ECB purchases governmental bonds through the Public Sector Purchase Programs (PSPP) since March 
2015. Further, the ECB stimulates bank lending to the real economy through targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTRO) since June 2014. 
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is being introduced and applied. Against the backdrop of DBRS’s significance with reference 
to the continuation of the bond purchase and financial sector refinancing programs, a better 
understanding and estimation of DBRS (future) rating decisions serves a crucial purpose 
equally for investors, institutions and politicians.  
My key findings can be summarized as follow. The DBRS rating methodology lacks 
transparency. Susceptibility to debt shocks is significantly underrepresented. The replicated 
DBRS sovereign risk model of Portugal identifies the “political commitment to fiscal 
consolidation” as the striking justification for the ongoing issuance of investment-grading.3 The 
OLS regression identifies a country’s past default history, governmental effectiveness, rule of 
law and the long-term growth rate to have significantly greater effects under the DBRS rating 
framework than it is the case for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. The rating scale model by 
Studer and Winkelmann attests DBRS to subjectively inflate its objective (fundamental) rating 
decisions of Portugal on average by one rating notch. Portugal’s subjective rating component 
has been diminishing over time, suggesting the rating grades to gradually approach their 
“fundamental” value. The cross-country subjective adjustment average is neutral. The DBRS 
rating decision on Portugal is, in the absence of changes in fundamental economic and political 
conditions, not expected to change in the medium-term. 
The remainder of my paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present and review relevant 
literature. Section 3 covers the qualitative rating analysis. Section 4 presents the DBRS rating 
model replication. Section 5 provides the empirical analysis of rating decisions on Portugal, 
both in comparison with the major rating agencies as well as within DBRS cross-country 
ratings. A rating outlook is presented in section 6. In section 7, I conclude and make suggestions 
for future rating research. 
2  Literature Review 
Bhatia and Lin (2022) provide a comprehensive introduction and qualitative evaluation of the 
sovereign credit rating methodologies of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. Potential 
methodological improvements and rating failures across time are thereby examined. Literature 
on the determinants of sovereign risk is sizeable. Cantor and Packer (1996) identify per capita 
income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default 
history as S&P’s and Moody’s risk determinants under the application of an OLS regression. 
                                                          
3 DBRS Rating Report of Portugal from 21 October 2016 and 21 April 2017. 
6 
   
Several papers since then have evaluated sovereign risk determinants, mostly using ordinary 
least squared regressions or ordered probit models.4 Afonso et al. (2011) extend the research by 
distinguishing between short-term and long-term determinants employing linear and ordered 
response models.  
Given the partially limited access and low transparency on agencies (sovereign) rating 
methodologies, the literature on rating model replications is scarce. D’Agostino and Lennkh 
(2016) reverse-engineer the Moody’s sovereign rating model to obtain sovereign ratings of 19 
Euro member countries from 2005 to 2015.  
This paper’s quantitative section closely follows Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis’s 
research approach (2014). Ratings are decomposed into their subjective and objective rating 
components using OLS regressions. Significant subjective rating distortions for specific 
country groups – predominantly during the 2009-2011 sovereign debt crisis – are attested. Teker 
et al. (2013) have followed similar rating analysis through a factor based ordered probit model. 
Focus is laid on pre and post-crisis differences of Fitch Ratings’ decisions for various country 
groups. Moor, Luitel, Sercu and Vanpee (2017) apply an ordered logit model to investigate the 
subjective rating components and find that investment-graded countries are more prone to 
positive subjective adjustments. An EC regulatory framework was installed in 2009 with the 
purpose to increase transparency in the sovereign rating processes, ergo to reduce the degree of 
subjective judgement in final rating decisions.5 However, Amstad and Packer (2015) 
empirically disprove methodological improvements.  
3  Qualitative Rating Analysis 
3.1  Rating History on Portugal 
The Canadian rating agency DBRS started issuing sovereign credit ratings in 2000. Since 
then, DBRS has continuously been expanding its rating portfolio to a total of 36 countries.6 
                                                          
4 Afonso et al. (2007) identify GDP per capita, real GDP growth, government debt, government effectiveness, 
external debt, external reserves and default history as determinants under the application of random effects 
ordered probit models. 
5 EC Regulation No.1060/2009. 
6 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States of America, Uruguay. 
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Portugal was first rated by the agency in November 2011. In comparison with the Big Three, 








Source: DBRS, S&P, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, Bloomberg8 
The Big Three have downgraded Portugal in the course of the European sovereign debt 
crisis 2009-2011 to “speculative” status. Moody’s firstly withdrew Portugal investment grading 
in July 2011, Fitch Ratings and S&P followed shortly in November 2011 respectively January 
2012.9 The 10 Year yield curve of Portugal reacted correspondingly, reaching a record high of 
15 percent in January 2012. DBRS on the contrary has continuously been holding on to attesting 
Portugal “investment grade” status. While its rating has also been downgraded in 2011 and 
2012, the rating grades have steadily been above the “speculative grade” threshold. Since 
December 2012, DBRS attests Portugal the lowest possible sovereign investment grade “BBB“. 
The comparably dovish rating behaviour of DBRS on Portugal cannot be generalized for all 
DBRS country rating decisions.10  
                                                          
7 S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings are referred to as the “ Big Three” throughout this paper. 
8 Rating decisions retrieved and collected from S&P, Moody’s, Fitch Rating’s and DBRS’s online databases. 
9 All rating equal or higher than “BBB-“/”Baa3” are defined as “investment grades”, any ratings below “BBB-
“/”Baa3” are classified as “speculative”. 
10 Instancing, S&P has been issuing Greece the rating “B-“ since January 2016, while DBRS has been issuing the 
lower “CCC+” grade since June 2016. 
Figure 1: Historic sovereign ratings - Portugal 
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3.2  Comparison with S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings 
For the purpose to analyze the degree of rating disparities between the Big Three and DBRS, I 
convert all four rating agencies’ alphanumeric ratings into their numeric values following the 









Figure 2: Rating differences – Portugal 
Source: DBRS, S&P, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s11 
Followed by S&P and Fitch Ratings, Moody’s shows the biggest discrepancies to DBRS’s 
rating decisions on Portugal, up to a maximum of five rating notches.12 Rating disparities have 
diminised over time though. Since September 2015 the rating decisions of the Big Three and 
DBRS differ by only one rating notch – the decisive rating threshold between “investment 
grade” and “speculative” status though. 
All four rating agencies define sovereign default risk in a different manner. Moody’s ratings 
capture the expected loss, a function of the probability default and expected recovery rate after 
default. S&P ratings only reflect the probability of a default event; timing, severity and recovery 
values are subordinate. Fitch Ratings reflect the probability of default until default occurs, only 
accounting for expected recovery rates after the default event already incurred (Bhatia, 2002). 
DBRS ratings reflect the probability of default or the likelihood of full debt repayment in a 
timely manner.13 
                                                          
11 Rating decisions are retrieved and collected from the agencies’ online research portals. 
12 In fall 2011, DBRS was issuing a stable investment grade of “A-“ while Moody’s already engaged in attesting 
Portugal the speculative rating grade “Ba2” (respective “BB”). 
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Table 1: Core rating risk factors of the Big Three and DBRS 
DBRS S&P Fitch Ratings Moody’s 
 
Fiscal Management and 
Policy 
 
Debt and Liquidity 
 
Economic Structure and 
Financial Stability 
 
Monetary Policy and 
Financial Stability 
 




























Susceptibility to Event Risk 
Source: DBRS, S&P, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s14 
The Moody’s rating model consists of four core risk categories, each indicator’s 
performance is assessed on a range of very high plus (VH+) to very low minus (VL-). The 
rating procedure is rather cumbersome. Event scenarios under which the scorecard generated 
ratings are subjectively adjusted are outlined, the actual adjustment range however remains 
arbitrary. The S&P rating model is comprised of five key factors, each factor’s performance is 
assessed on a scale from one (weakest) to six (strongest). The final sovereign indicative rating 
is subject to max. +/- one subjective notch adjustment. The rating methodology is only partly-
transparent, specifications on rating weightings are undisclosed. Fitch Ratings follows a 
multiple regression model accounting for 18 key risk variables. A forward-looking “Qualitative 
Overlay” framework allows the regression results to be adjusted for factors not captured by the 
model. Each one of the four rating pillars are subject to max. +/- two notch adjustments with an 
overall rating adjustment range of max. +/- three notches. The DBRS rating framework 
accounts for total six risk categories, assessed on a numeric scale of zero (low risk) to ten (high 
risk). Subjective rating adjustments are fully incomprehensible. Details on the DBRS rating 
methodology are introduced in the subsequent section 4.1. 
                                                          
14 Publicly available methodology manuals of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and DBRS. 
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4  Rating Model Replication  
4.1  Structure and Composition 
The DBRS rating framework is composed of two analytical pillars, a sovereign scorecard and 
a debt sustainability analysis. The latter has an effective impact of only five percent on the 
overall rating grade.  
Within the sovereign scorecard, the risk factors (of both qualitative and quantitative nature) 
are grouped into six categories. Each risk category is comprised of minimum one primary 
element, in turn consisting of miminum one core indicator. Evaluated based on their historical 
and prospected performance, risk factors are individually scaled from 0=low risk to 10=high 
risk. Scores are individually weighted within and summed across the six categories and thus 
generate an overall scorecard result from 0=no default risk to 60=high default risk. The 
composite numeric score is lastly transformed into its respective alphanumeric rating grade. 
DBRS claims that its rating decisions are more responsive to changes in fundamental 
characteristics rather than to changes in “cyclical economic conditions” – technical 
specifications are not disclosed.15 The transparency on the DBRS sovereign rating approach 
overall is considerably low – characteristic for the (sovereign) credit rating industry as a whole. 
Further, DBRS reserves for its final rating committee decisions to significantly deviate from 
the scorecard-generated result as “the relative importance of risk factors can vary” across 
countries. Tangible rules or adjustment ranges at this are fully undisclosed. 
4.2  Replication Procedure 
The replicated sovereign risk model of Portugal consists of total 43 qualitative and quantitative 
indicators. DBRS provides the data evaluation, threshold application and weighting of 16 risk 
indicators outlined in a hypothetical country rating model.16 I augment this model with 
additional 27 risk indicators collected from a risk indicator list further provided by DBRS.17  
Those 27 indicators’ evaluation, thresholds and weightings follow – to the extent possible - the 
the data assessment, scoring and weighting of the 16 indicators provided with in the 
hypothetical country rating model. For transparency, the 27 indicators following self-evaluated 
data assessment and threshold establishments are color-marked green in my model. The 16 
                                                          
15 DBRS outlines fiscal responsibility, debt sustainability, economic diversification, price stability and the 
stability of the political system as exemplary fundamental country factors. 
16 DBRS. 2016. “Rating Sovereign Governments Methodology”. Appendix B, Table 1. 
17 DBRS. 2016. “Rating Sovereign Governments Methodology”. Appendix A. 
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indicators with fully disclosed data assessment and threshold establishment are non color-
marked. 
For simplicity, subsequent rating steps a) - e) are illustrated at hand of the risk category 
Debt and Liquidity.18 The full list of all 43 indicators’ data assessment, performance evaluation 
and weighing is provided in the Appendix.  
 
a) Data Evaluation 
Each risk factor is individually evaluated, predominantely by taking the average of a 
combination of historical and forecasted datapoints. Data is mainly collected from large 
international institutions such as IMF, Worldbank and OECD. The individual data evaluation 
of all 43 indicators is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Table 2: Replicated model - Data evaluation 
Debt & Liquidity  Indicator Data assessment 
Debt Stock General Government Gross Debt (%GDP) 
Projected debt stock as of end of next 
calendar year 
Private Sector Debt 
  
Non-Financial Corporate Debt (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 
Household Debt (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 




Short-Term Public Debt (%GDP) Last available data 
Average Maturity of Public Sector Debt (Years) Last available data 
State Borrowing Requirements (%GDP) Average of 3 years projections 
Susceptibility to Debt 
Shocks 
Debt Sustainability Analysis - Change in Debt Stock 
Total net change from base year 2016  to 




b) Indicator Scaling 
Evaluated based on their historical and prospected future performance, each factor is scaled 
from 0=low risk to 10=high risk under the application of individual - and mostly arbitrarily 
chosen – thresholds. If not given guidance by similar indicators outlined in the hypothetical 
country model, indicator values of worse and better performing OECD countries are used as a 
                                                          
18 To shortly exhibit the general model structure at this example, Debt and Liquidity represents one of the six risk 
categories. Debt Stock, Maturity Structure and Liquid Assets represent two of the category’s primary elements, 
General Government Gross Debt and Short-Term Public Debt in turn two of its total seven core elements. The 
number of primary elements and core elements varies across categories. 
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strong guide for the threshold establishment of the additional 27 indicators.19 The indicator 
scaling for all factors is provided in Appendix 4.   
Table 3: Replicated model - Indicator scaling 
Debt and Liquidity  Indicator Unit 
Thresholds 
Value Score (0-10) 
Low risk High risk 
Debt Stock 
General Government Gross Debt 
(%GDP) 
% 30,00 130,00 127,73 9,77 
Private Sector Debt 
  
Non-Financial Corporate Debt 
(%GDP) 
% 30,00 130,00 147,09 10,00 
Household Debt (%GDP) % 30,00 130,00 86,70 5,67 




Short-Term Public Debt (%GDP) % 5 15 11,93 6,93 
Average Maturity of Public Sector 
Debt 
years 10,00 3,00 8,42 2,25 
State Borrowing Requirements 
(%GDP) 
% 3,00 10,00 9,17 8,81 
Susceptibility to Debt 
Shocks 
Debt Sustainability Analysis - Change 
in Debt Stock 
% 5,00 30,00 18,50 5,40 
 
c) Weightings 
Each primary element’s score represents the average of its core elements’ scores, weightings 
within a category can vary. Each one of the six categories is equally weighted within the rating 
framework. The weighting for my augmented model is built on the weighting structure provided 
for the DBRS hypothetical country model.20 The weighting structure of the entire replicated 
model is outlined in Appendix 5.  
 
Table 4: Replicated model – Weighting 













General Government Gross Debt 
(%GDP) 
9,77 9,77 30% 5,00% 
Private Sector Debt 





Household Debt (%GDP) 5,67 3,33% 




Short-Term Public Debt (%GDP) 6,93 
6,00 20% 
3,33% 
Average Maturity of Public Sector 
Debt (Years) 
2,25 3,33% 
State Borrowing Requirements 
(%GDP) 
8,81 3,33% 
Susceptibility to Debt 
Shocks 
Debt Susceptibility Analysis - 
Change in Debt Stock 
5,40 5,40 30% 5,00% 
                                                          
19 Instancing, the threshold establishment for income inequality takes the Gini coefficient of Norway (0.25) and 
Brazil (0.5) as its low and high risk benchmarks. 
20 DBRS. 2016. “Rating Sovereign Governments Methodology”. Appendix A. Table 2.  
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d) Scorecard Mapping 
Lastly, the indicative scorecard result is transformed into its respective alphanumeric rating 
grade following a sovereign scorecard map. In the case of Portugal, the current sovereign credit 
rating of “BBB-“ corresponds to a numeric value of roughly 34. 
Table 5: Sovereign scorecard map 
Credit Rating Minimum score 
AAA 12 
AA range 18 
A range 24 
BBB range 30 
BB range 36 
B range 42 
CCC range 48 
CC range 54 
C range 60 
Source: DBRS21 
 
e) Foreign currency vs. local currency sovereign rating 
As it is the case for all advanced country, the strong international market integration of Portugal 
makes a differentiation between foreign currency and local currency sovereign rating 
redundant.  
4.3  Results 
My replicated model generates a numeric scorecard result falling within the lower “BBB range” 
as corresponding to Table 5. The replicated sovereign scorecard identifies Fiscal Management 
& Policy and Debt & Liquidity as the highest risk categories. Positive momentum emanates 
from Political Environment, the degree of “political commitment to fiscal consolidation” 
thereby plays a significant role.22 Strong positive effects emanate from individual risk factors 
such as the Rate of Inflation, Current Account Balance and Capital Account Balance.23 
Negative momentum originates from the individual risk factors Interest Payment (% Revenue), 
Public and Non-Financial Corporate Debt, State Borrowing Requirements, Total Domestic 
                                                          
21 DBRS.2016. “Rating Sovereign Governments Methodology” manual.  
22 DBRS Rating Report of Portugal from 21 October 2016 and 21 April 2017. 
23 Full list of risk factors’ scores provided in Appendix 4. 
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Savings Rate, Loan to Deposit Ratio as well as Gross International Investment Position and Net 
External Debt. 
Table 6: Replicated model - Scorecard results for Portugal  
Categories Scorecard results 
Fiscal Management & Policy 6,78 
Debt and Liquidity 7,32 
Economic Structure & Performance 4,34 
Monetary Policy & Financial Stability 5,43 
Balance of Payments 6,17 
Political Environment 3,98 
 Total 34,02 
 
Political Environment is the most qualitatively captured category of all. The category consists 
of two purely qualitative primary elements: a) Institutional environment is assessed based on 
World Bank Indexes, while b) Political commitment to address economic challenges and 
service debt is based fully on the subjective assessment of the DBRS rating committee. Latter 
holds 50% of the category’s rating scale and 8.33% on the final rating scale. DBRS provides a 
qualitative assessment on Political Environment in its rating reports, the justification and 
transparency of this category is however not satisfactory. As already stated, this paper identifies 
the “political commitment to fiscal consolidation” as the striking justification for ongoing 
investment grading of Portugal. The currently most decisive rating aspect therefore underlies a 
fully subjective assessment, making potential crucial rating alterations in large part 
incomprehensible for external parties.  
Although presented as a major rating pillar, the debt sustainability analysis has a rather 
negligible effect on DBRS rating decision. Given Portugal’s comparably high public debt stock, 
its susceptibility to (external) shocks – along with its harmful risk channels – should be given 
a stronger significance within the model.  
Given its individual rating weights, the model output is most sensitive to changes in 
following variables: Net International Investment Position (4.17%), Net External Liabilities 
(4.17%), General Government Gross Debt (5%), Debt Susceptibility Analysis (5%), and 
Commitment to address economic challenges and service debt (8.33%).  
The results are evidently subject to the appropriateness of the replicated model. Yet, 
identified risk sources are robust to various weight and threshold calibrations. 
15 
   
5  Empirical Analysis  
5.1  Risk factor effects: Cross-agency comparison  
For the empirical analysis of rating differences among S&P, Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and 
DBRS, I compare the cross-agency rating effects of ten fundamental economic variables. I 
thereby closely follow the OLS regression approach conducted by Vernazza, Nielsen and 
Gkionakis (2014), who already modeled rating decisions of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Ratings 
on ten best-fitting risk variables. By replicating their approach to DBRS rating grades, 
parameter estimates can directly be compared across all four rating agencies.  
A panel data set of total 224 end-of-year DBRS rating decisions of 36 different countries 𝑖 
from November 2000 until March 2017 are OLS-regressed on the fundamental variables 
vector 𝜒𝑖𝑡 and a macro time effect 𝑍𝑡.
24 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝜒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                (1) 
Alphanumeric rating variables are again converted into numeric values following the 
conversion table in Appendix 1. The ten fundamental economic variables are chosen based on 
goodness-of-fit tests conducted by Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis.  
Table 7: Definition of variables – OLS regression 
Variable Definition Units Data Source25 
Nominal GDP GDP in current prices USD tn. IMF  
GDP per capita Nominal GDP per person, PPP-adjusted USD thous. IMF 
GDP growth Average annual real GDP growth, t-9 to t Percent IMF 
Public Debt General government gross debt Percent of GDP IMF, own calculations 
Current Account Annual current account balance Percent of GDP IMF 
External Debt Goss external debt Percent of GDP BIS, own calculations 
Past Default 
Dummy variable taking value 1 in all years 
following a default event since 1960, 0 
otherwise 
Binary 




Dummy variable taking the value 1 if country 
classified as Advanced Country by IMF, 0 
otherwise 
Binary IMF 
Government World Bank Government Effectiveness Index Index World Bank  
Law World Bank Rule of Law Index Index World Bank 
                                                          
24 Ratings from 2017 are grades published in the first half of the year as end-of-year ratings are not available yet. 
25 IMF World Economic Outlook 2017, BIS= Bank of International Settlement 
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Table 8: OLS regression results 



























































































No. Observations 999 1108 971 224 
No. Countries 94 103 94 36 
R-sq. 0.79 0.82 0.79 0.98 
+ Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; ***1% 
a Regression results for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings are taken from Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis (2016), 
DBRS regression results are depicted in Appendix 2. 
A number of DBRS parameters are statistically insignificant. This might be due to the 
significantly smaller number of available DBRS rating observations or due to the 
inappropriateness of the best-fitted explanatory variables under the DBRS rating framework.26  
The regression model predicts Public Debt, Current Account and External Debt to similarily 
affect rating decisions across all agencies. GDP per capita and the dummy variable Advanced 
Country appear to play a comparably smaller role under the DBRS rating framework, the 
estimators are also statistically insignificant. Past Default history, long-term GDP growth as 
well as the Government and Law index are expected to have significant larger effects under the 
DBRS rating framework than it is the case for S&P, Moody’s or Fitch Ratings.27  
                                                          
26 The S&P results from Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis show similar levels of low significance.  
27 As it is the case under most agencies, the Law indicator is statistically insignificant for DBRS as well. 
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5.2  Subjective rating component analysis among DBRS cross-country ratings  
In the paper by Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis (2014) rating grades are further broken down 
into their subjective and objective rating components. The fitted values of their OLS regressions 
are thereby defined as the objective component - ratings solely based on the ten fundamental 
variables. The difference between the observed and fitted values (residuals) are interpreted as 
the subjective rating adjustment.28 
As already assessed in this paper, DBRS fails to deliver tangible rules on its subjective rating 
adjustments, thereby leaving a potentially significant component of the DBRS rating decision 
on Portugal incomprehensible. The motivation to further analyze the significance of the 
subjective rating components for the rating decisions on Portugal – in specific its comparison 
within the DBRS cross-country ratings -  is therefore considerably high.  
Cross-panel DBRS rating decisions are therefore fragmented into their subjective and objective 
rating component following the Vernaza, Nielsen and Gkionakis analysis approach. The model 
itself is however significantly altered in this paper. 
 
(a)  
The analysis of rating dependent variables under the application of an OLS-regression has 
significant shortcomings. The dependent variable is unbounded, categories are assummed to be 
equi-distant and marginal effects to be constant. Ratings are however bounded within the rating 
scale from default status “D” to highest investment grading “AAA”. Changes in risk variables 
along the rating scale can depict varying marginal effects - in specific when reaching the uppper 
and lower rating grade limits. An OLS regression is therefore only suitable to a limited extent. 
Ordered probit models treat variables as ordinal, and thereby cannot serve the purpose to 
fractionally decompose DBRS rating grades. Further, the ordered probit model’s interpretation 
becomes laborous with an increasing number of categories – a minimum of 24 ordinal 
categories in the sovereign risk rating case.  
I therefore follow an alterative rating scale model developed by Studer and Winkelmann 
(2016), applying a Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE).29 The random 
component  𝑦𝑖𝑡 is assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution. The expected value of  𝑦𝑖𝑡 (mean 
reponse) depends on the linear predictor of the explanatory variables through a probit function 
                                                          
28 Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis follow a rather “maximalist definition” by lumping the entire residual into 
the subjective part (Moor, Luitel, Sercu and Vanpee, 2017). 
29 Studer and Winkelmann apply the QMLE rating model for the analysis of health care ratings. 
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𝐺(𝑥).30 The model allows me to obtain fitted fractional values, to comply with rating 
boundaries and to allow for non-constant marginal effects. 
Following the Bernoulli distribution, the limited dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 has to lie within 
the range of [0, 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥] with a probability of 1 and 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 as the rating grade “AAA”. The 
numerically converted rating variables (again following the rating conversion table in Appendix 
1) threrefore need to be transformed into their respective fractional values. The lowest rating 
bound “D” corresponds to a numeric value of 2. The dependent fractional variable 𝑦𝑖 therefore 
has to be computed as follow 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (y𝑖𝑡 − 2)/𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥           with 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 22                                   (2) 
with the scaled probit model version of  
𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜙(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)                               (3)  
and the Bernoulli quasi-likelihood function for 𝑛 observations of 














 .                                   (4) 
Marginal effects diminish as the model approaches its upper and lower bounds, ultimately 




′ 𝛽)𝛽𝑙                                                           (5)       
Robust standard errors are used, the macro-time effect also remains in place.31 
 
(b)  
The ten best-fitting regressors under the Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis OLS model are not 
fully satisfactory and appropriate for my QMLE model. I replace PastDefault, Advanced 
Country, Law and Government with the new variables Investment, Unemployment Rate, 
National Savings Rate and Inflation.32 Further, all variables are evaluated following the DBRS 
                                                          
30 The model can also be run with a logistic link function, coefficients are however slightly more significant 
under probit.  
31 As the dependent variable is not binary but a rating variable, Studer and Winkelmann (2016) apply robust 
standard errors.   
32 Indicators are either insignificant under the new model or not accounted for under the DBRS rating 
framework.  
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rating methodology.33 Data is collected from the IMF World Economic Outlook 2017.34 Again, 
the model is based on a panel data set of 224 observations, consisting of DBRS end-of-year 
rating decisions of total 36 different countries 𝑖 from November 2000 until March 2017.  
Table 9: Definition of variables - Rating scale model 
 
Regression results are presented in Appendix 2. The coefficients reported are asymptotically 
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimators. All variables are statistically strongly significant. 
The estimated effects and standard errors need to be retransformed into their actual values by 
multiplying by 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥. Parameter signs are as anticipated, with the exception of GDP Growth. 
Further coefficients interpretation is however not objective of this empirical analysis.  
Following Vernazza, Nielsen and Gkionakis, the difference between observed and fitted 
ratings represent the subjective rating component. The fitted fractional rating grades 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  are 




∗ 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 2                                                  (6) 
 
The model’s goodness-of fit is tested under the criterion of deviance as well as the Akaike 
(AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria. 
                                                          
33 Accounting for the DBRS longer-term rating approach (e.g. taking the average of 10/5 Y historic data + 3 Y 
forecasted data points), in individual cases constrained by data availability (e.g. External Debt). National 
Savings Rate is accounted for as “Last available data” and Public Debt as “Projected next calendar year value” 
value under the DBRS rating framework. 
34 With the exception for External Debt, collected from the Bank of International Settlement (SDDS Databank). 
Variable Definition Units Data Evaluation 
Public Debt 
General Gov. Gross 
Debt 
Percent of GDP Projected next calendar year value 
GDP growth Real GDP growth rate USD tn. 
10 years historical data + 3 years 
projections 




Percent of GDP 
10 years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
Current Account Current Account Percentage of GDP 
5 Years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
Investment Total Investment Percent of GDP 
5 Years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate  
Percent of total 
labor force 






5 Years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
National Savings Rate Total National Savings Percent of GDP Last available data 
External Debt Gross External Debt Percent of GD Last available data 
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The model attests DBRS a comparably “dovish” rating behavior on Portugal, on average 
inflating the objective rating by one subjective notch adjustment (+1.01). The subjective rating 
component among all DBRS cross-country ratings is neutral (-2.5E-5).35 A generally more 









When depicting the subjective rating component of Portugal across time, the extent of 
subjective rating adjustment appears to diminish since reaching its peak in 2013. The model 
therefore suggests DBRS rating decisions on Portugal to gradually approach their 








Figure 4: Subjective rating component - Portugal 
                                                          
35 Interestingly, the negative outliers depicted in Figure 3 are DBRS rating decisions on Cyprus in the years 2013 
and 2014, and Argentina in 2015. 
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6  Rating Outlook 
S&P and Moody’s have reaffirmed their “BB+” respectively “Ba1” ratings earlier this year, and 
both outlooks remain stable. In line with the predictions provided based on preliminary results 
of my models, DBRS has kept its rating decision on April 21, 2017 unchanged to “BBB-“ with 
a stable outlook. Fundamental economic and political conditions have not changed substantially 
since its last rating report in October 2016. The high indebtedness of both the private (non-
financial corporate debt level of 117 percent of GDP) and public sector (gross government debt 
of 128 percent GDP) remain the limiting factors. External debt (220 percent of GPD) is one of 
the highest worldwide. Commitment to fiscal consolidation is assessed to still be strong. Budget 
deficit improvements (2 percent of GDP in 2016) will likely allow Portugal to leave the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure early. Large parts of fiscal improvements are however due to one-
off measures (e.g. the PERES program) and significant cuts in public investment.37 Receding 
banking sector risks (due to e.g. the finalized sale of Novo Banco and the recapitalization of 
Caixa Geral de Depositós and Banco Comercial Português) give a positive momentum, are 
however not expected to change the rating grade. The share of non-performing loans remains 
alerting (12% of total loans). The ECB has been gradually reducing its monthly bond buying 
purchase volumes, expected to be tapering out by the end of this year.38 Pressure on 
governmental bond yields is (ceteris paribus) anticipated.  
Against the backdrop of the outlined economic situation of Portugal as well as the potential 
rating adjustment scenarios given by DBRS itself, I expect the DBRS rating decision on 
Portugal to remain unchanged for this calendar year. 






                                                          
37 Special Program for Reduction of Debt to the State Department (PERES): incentive-creating tax repayment 
scheme for households and corporations. The program is estimated of having generated 300 Mio. EUR one-off 
state revenues for the 2016 state budget.  
38 Constrained by the capital key and the ECB rule to hold max. one third of a country’s total outstanding debt as 
well as the PSPP program’s expected termination by the end of this year.  
39 DBRS Rating Report of Portugal from 21 October 2016 and 21 April 2017. 
Downward Upward 
Deterioration in public debt dynamics 
Sustainable improvement in public 
finances 
Contraction of fiscal 
consolidation/political commitment 
Robust medium-term growth prospects 
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7  Conclusion 
In this paper, I provide a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the DBRS sovereign rating 
methodology. Both my qualitative and empirical analysis attest DBRS a comparably dovish 
rating behavior on Portugal, not only in comparison with the Big Three’s rating decisions but 
also within the DBRS cross-country ratings. The replicated model identifies Fiscal 
Management & Policy and Debt & Liquidity as the highest risk categories. A positive 
momemtum emanates from the risk category Political Environment. The “political commitment 
to fiscal consolidation” is identified as the striking qualitative justification of ongoing 
investment grading of Portugal. The transparency on the DBRS rating methodology is 
significantly low. On average, the Portuguese objective rating is subjectively inflated by one 
rating notch.  
From a technical point of view, it could be interesting to study further the rating scale model 
introduced by Studer and Wineklmann (2016) and to compare its results obtained in this paper 
employing alternative rating analysis approaches.40 Additionally, one could elaborate further 
what events or indicator changes underlie the extraordinary positive subjective rating 
adjustment in 2013. Further, one could extend the subjective rating component analysis to other 
countries. For example, Cyprus, Argentina and Greece would be of great interest to analyze, in 
specific its component developments during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Just like any other model, the DBRS rating model has its shortcomings. This paper finds 
significant subjective rating adjustment in the case of Portugal, which does not necessarily 
indicate that the DBRS rating model is flawed and imprecise per se. The incorporation of 
(qualitative) country-specific advantages and disadvantages can result in more appropriate and 
sophisticated final rating decisions than to purely follow quantifiable output. Rating agencies 
should however - particularly DBRS - be more transparent in their rating assessment. 
D’Agostino and Lennkh (2016) recommend the publication of two distinct credit ratings: a) a 
purely quantitatively derived grade as well as b) a final rating including the rating agency’s 
subjective adjustment. Market participants could then assess and evaluate the appropriateness 




                                                          
40 In specific in comparison with the well-established and frequently applied ordered probit model. 
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9  Appendix 
Appendix 1: Rating conversion table 
Fitch Ratings Moody’s S&P DBRS Numerical Scale 
AAA Aaa AAA AAA 24 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ AA+ 23 
AA Aa2 AA AA 22 
AA- Aa3 AA- AA- 21 
A+ A1 A+ A+ 20 
A A2 A A 19 
A- A3 A- A- 18 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 17 
BBB Baa2 BBB BBB 16 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- BBB- 15 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ BB+ 14 
BB Ba2 BB BB 13 
BB- Ba3 BB- BB- 12 
B+ B1 B+ B+ 11 
B B2 B B 10 
B- B3 B- B- 9 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 8 
CCC Caa2 CCC CCC 7 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- CCC- 6 
CC Ca CC CC 5 
C C C C 4 
DDD  SD SD 3 
DD  D D 2 
D    1 
 
Appendix 2: Regression Output 
 
OLS Regression+ 
(ordinal dependent rating variable) 
QMLE  Regression+* 
(fractional dependent rating variable)  
Nominal GDP 0.241***  
 (0.069)  
GDP per capita 0.017  
 (0.028)  
GDP growth 0.442***  
 (0.125)  
Public Debt -0.021***  
 (0.006)  
Current Account -0.041  
 (0.051)  
External Debt (OLS as well as QMLE) -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Default -3.134***  
 (0.645)  
Advanced Country  0.010  
 (1.158)  
Government Effectiveness Index 3.483***  
 (0.955)  
Rule of Law Index 0.948  
 (0.753)  
Public Debt (QMLE)  -0.009*** 
  (0.001) 
GDP Growth (QMLE)  -0.131*** 
  (0.039) 
National Savings Rate (QMLE)  -0.066** 
  (0.027) 
Current Account (QMLE)  0.105*** 
  (0.021) 
GDP per capita (QMLE)  0.052*** 
  (0.006) 
Structural Balance (QMLE)  -0.071*** 
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  (0.021) 
Unemployment Rate (QMLE)  -0.039*** 
  (0.008) 
Inflation Rate (QMLE)  -0.082*** 
  (0.017) 
Investment Rate (QMLE)  0.128*** 
  (0.027) 
   
Observations 224 224 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.984  
Deviance  13.55 
+Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; ***1% 
*The QMLE Regression uses different data assessment than the OLS regression in the attempt to replicate the DBRS rating methodology as 
close as possible (Table 9). 
 
Appendix 3: Replicated Model - Data Assessment 
Primary Element Indicator Methodology 
Fiscal Management & Policy     
Overall Fiscal Performance Overall Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 
Average of 10 years historical data + 3 years 
projection 
  Structural Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 
Average of 10 years historical data + 3 years 
projection 
  Primary Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 
Average of 10 years historical data + 3 years 
projection 
  Interest Payments (%Revenues) Last available data 
Gov. Policy Management & Budget Control Government Policymaking Transparency Global Competitiveness Index - Last available data  
  Quality of Public Spending Global Competitiveness Index - Last available data  
  Public Investment (%GDP) Last available data 
Debt and Liquidity     
Debt Stock General Government Gross Debt (%GDP) Projected debt stock as of end of next calendar year 
Private Sector Debt Non-Financial Corporate Debt (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 
  Household Debt (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 
Maturity Structure & Liquid Assets Short-Term Public Debt (%GDP) Last available data 
  Average Maturity of Public Sector Debt (Years) Last available data 
  State Borrowing Requirements (%GDP) Average of 3 years projections 
Susceptibility to Debt Shocks Debt Sustainability Analysis - Change in Debt Stock 
Total net change from base year 2016  to 2021 
(mixed shock scenario) - IMF DSA 2016 
Economic Structure & Performance     
Econ. Growth & Productivity Real GDP p.c. Growth (%) 
Average  of 10 years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
  GDP p.c. (Thous. USD) Average of 10  years historical data 
  Human Development Index UNDP Index - Last available data 
Econ. Resilience & Flexibility Output Volatility (%) 
Standard deviation of real GDP growth rate 
measured over 20 years of historical data + projected 
next 3 years 
  Unemployment Rate (%) 
Average of 5 years historical data + 3 years 
projection 
  Doing Business Ranking World Bank World Bank Index - Last available data 
  Change in Real Unit Labor Cost (%) Average of 5 years historical data 
Private Sector Investment & Savings Households Investment Rate  Average of 5 years historical data 
  Non-Financial Corporate Investment Rate Average of 5 years historical data 
Demographics Population Growth 
Average of 10 years historical data + 3 years 
projection 
Income Distribution Gini-Coefficient Last available data 
Monetary Policy & Financial Stability     
Policy Credibility Rate of Inflation (%) 
Average of 5 years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
  Total Domestic Savings (%GDP) Last available data 
  
Change in 10Y PGB Yields during Economic 
Slowdown* 
Average annual change over 17 years historical data 
(Bps) 
Financial Risk Gross Non-Performing Loans (%Total Loans) Last available data 
  Loan to Deposit Ratio Last available data 
  Tier 1 Capital Ratio Last available data 
  Regulation Securities Exchanges Global Competitiveness Index - Last available data 
Balance of Payments     
External Imbalance Current Account Balance (%GDP) 
Average of 5 years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
  Capital Account Balance (%GDP) 
Average of 5 years historical data + 3 years 
projections 
  Foreign Direct Investment (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 
  Change in Terms of Trade Average of 5 years historical data 
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Net Investment Position & Foreign Reserves 
Liquidity 
Net International Investment Position (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 
  Gross External Liabilities (%GDP) Average of 5 years historical data 
Political Environment     
Institutional Environment Voice and Accountability (Index) 
World Bank Governance Indicators -  Last availble 
data 
  Rule of Law (Index) 
World Bank Governance Indicators -  Last availble 
data 
  Government Effectiveness (Index) Global Competitiveness Index - Last available data  
  Judicial Independence (Index) Global Competitiveness Index - Last available data  
Commitment to address economic 
challenges and service debt 
Government capacity and willingness to act in 
response to economic and financial challenges  
subjective assessment based on thought exchange 
with institutional representatives and bank-intern 
discussions   
*Economic slowdown defined as: real annual GDP growth ≤ 0.5 of standard deviation of historical real GDP growth (17 years) 
  
 
Appendix 4: Replicated Model - Indicator Scaling 
Primary Element Indicator Unit 
Threshold 
Value Score (0-10) 
Low risk High risk 
Fiscal Management & Policy             
Overall Fiscal Performance Overall Fiscal Balance (%GDP) % 0,00 -8,00 -5,25 6,56 
  Structural Fiscal Balance (%GDP) % 0,00 -6,00 -3,64 6,07 
  Primary Fiscal Balance (%GDP) % 0,00 -3,00 -1,53 5,08 
  Interest Payment (%Revenue) % 5,00 8,00 10,29 10,00 
Gov. Policy Management & Budget 
Control 
Government Policymaking Transparency Index 7,00 1,00 3,90 5,17 
  Quality of Public Spending Index 7,00 1,00 2,80 7,00 
  Public Investment (%GDP) % 10,00 0,00 2,27 7,73 
Debt and Liquidity             
Debt Stock General Government Gross Debt (%GDP) % 30 130 127,73 9,77 
Private Sector Debt Non-Financial Corporate Debt (%GDP) % 30,00 130,00 147,09 10,00 
  Household Debt (%GDP) % 30,00 130,00 86,70 5,67 
Maturity Structure & Liquid Assets Short-Term Public Debt (%GDP) % 5 15 11,93 6,93 
  Average Maturity of Public Sector Debt Years 10,00 3,00 8,42 2,25 
  State Borrowing Requirements (%GDP) % 3,00 10,00 9,17 8,81 
Susceptibility to Debt Shocks 
Debt Sustainability Analysis - Change in Debt 
Stock 
% 5 30 18,50 5,40 
Economic Structure & Performance             
Econ. Growth & Productivity Real GDP p.c. Growth (%) % 4,00 -1,00 0,83 6,34 
  GDP p.c. (Thous. USD) 1000 USD 35 5 21,99 4,34 
  Human Development Index Index 1,00 0,00 0,83 1,70 
Econ. Resilience & Flexibility Output Volatility (%) % 1,00 6,00 2,15 2,31 
  Unemployment Rate (%) % 5,00 15,00 12,91 7,91 
  Doing Business Ranking World Bank Index 100,00 0,00 77,40 2,26 
  Change in Real Unit Labor Cost (%) % 0,00 2,00 0,47 2,36 
Private Sector Investment & Savings Households Investment Rate  % 10,00 2,00 4,78 6,53 
  Non-Financial Corporate Investment Rate % 30,00 10,00 20,33 4,83 
Demographics Population Growth % 0,25 -0,25 -0,06 6,18 
Income Distribution Gini-Coefficient Index 25,00 50,00 34,00 3,60 
Monetary Policy & Financial Stability             
Policy Credibility Rate of Inflation (%) % 3,00 15,00 0,88 0,00 
  Total Domestic Savings (%GDP) % 200 20 14,81 10,00 
  
Change in 10Y PGB Yields during Econ. 
Slowdown (Bps) 
bps -50 200 -41,92 0,32 
Financial Risk Gross Non-Performing Loans (%Total Loans) % 3,00 15,00 12,20 7,67 
  Loan to Deposit Ratio % 80,00 100,00 109,70 10,00 
  Tier 1 Capital Ratio % 20,00 8,00 12,78 6,02 
  Regulation Securities Exchanges Index 7,00 1,00 3,40 6,00 
Balance of Payments             
External Imbalance Current Account Balance (%GDP) % -1,00 -8,00 -0,28 0,00 
  Capital Account Balance (%GDP) % -1,00 -5,00 1,40 0,00 
  Foreign Direct Investment (%GDP) % 10,00 2,00 5,01 6,24 
  Change in Terms of Trade % 2,00 -2,00 0,76 3,11 
Net Investment Position & Foreign 
Reserves Liquidity 
Net International Investment Position (%GDP) % 0 -50 -130,18 10,00 
  Gross External Liabilities (%GDP) % 30,00 130,00 223,13 10,00 
Political Environment             
Institutional Environment Voice and Accountability (Index) Index 2,50 -2,50 1,12 2,75 
  Rule of Law (Index) Index 2,50 -2,50 1,14 2,71 
  Government Effectiveness Index 2,50 -2,50 1,23 2,54 
  Judicial Independence (Index) Index 7,00 1,00 4,70 3,83 
Commitment to address economic 
challenges and service debt 
Gov.  capacity & willingness to act in response 
to economic & financial challenges  
arbitrary* 0,00 10,00 5,00 5,00 
*subjective assessment based on thought exchange with institutional representatives and bank-intern discussions         
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Appendix 5: Replicated Model - Weighting 












Fiscal Management & Policy           6,78 
Overall Fiscal Performance 
Overall Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 6,56 
6,93 50% 
2,08%   
Structural Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 6,07 2,08%   
Primary Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 5,08 2,08%   
Interest Payment (%Revenue) 10,00 2,08%   
Gov. Policy Management & Budget 
Control 
Government Policymaking Transparency 5,17 
6,63 50% 
2,78%   
Quality of Public Spending 7,00 2,78%   
  Public Investment (%GDP) 7,73 2,78%   
Debt and Liquidity           7,32 
Debt stock General Government Gross Debt (%GDP) 9,77 9,77 30% 5,00%   
Private Sector Debt 
Non-Financial Corporate Debt (%GDP) 10,00 
7,83 20% 
1,67%   
Household Debt (%GDP) 5,67 1,67%   
Maturity Structure & Liquid Assets 
Short-Term Public Debt (%GDP) 6,93 
6,00 20% 
1,11%   
Average Maturity of Public Sector Debt 
(Years) 
2,25 1,11%   
State Borrowing Requirements (%GDP) 8,81 1,11%   
Susceptibility to Debt Shocks 
Debt Susceptibility Analysis - Change in Debt 
Stock 
5,40 5,40 30% 5,00%   
Economic Structure & Performance           4,34 
Econ. Growth & Productivity 
Real GDP p.c. Growth (%) 6,34 
4,12 45% 
2,50%   
GDP p.c. (Thous. USD) 4,34 2,50%   
Human Development Index 1,70 2,50%   
Econ. Resilience & Flexibility 
Output Volatility (%) 2,31 
4,16 30% 
1,25%   
Unemployment Rate (%) 7,91 1,25%   
Doing Business Ranking WorldBank 2,26 1,25%   
Change in Real Unit Labor Cost (%) 2,36 1,25%   
Private Sector Investment & Savings 
Households Investment Rate  6,53 
5,68 10% 
0,83%   
Non-Financial Corporate Investment Rate 4,83 0,83%   
Demographics Population Growth 6,18 6,18 5% 0,83%   
Income Distribution Gini-Coefficient 3,60 3,60 10% 1,67%   
Monetary Policy & Financial 
Stability 
          5,43 
Policy credibility 
Rate of Inflation (%) 0,00 
3,44 50% 
2,78%   
Total Domestic Savings (%GDP) 10,00 2,78%   
Change in 10Y PGB Yields during Econ. 
Slowdown (Bps) 
0,32 2,78%   
Financial risk 
Gross Non-Performing Loans (%Total Loans) 7,67 
7,42 50% 
2,08%   
Loan to Deposit Ratio 10,00 2,08%   
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 6,02 2,08%   
Regulation Securities Exchanges 6,00 2,08%   
Balance of Payments           6,17 
External Imbalance 
Current Account Balance (%GDP) 0,00 
2,34 50% 
2,08%   
Capital Account Balance (%GDP) 0,00 2,08%   
Foreign Direct Investment 6,24 2,08%   
Change in Terms of Trade 3,11 2,08%   
Net Investment Position & Foreign 
Reserves Liquidity 
Net International Investment Position (%GDP) 10,00 
10,00 50% 
4,17%   
Gross External Liabilities (%GDP) 10,00 4,17%   
Political Environment           3,98 
Institutional Environment 
  
Voice and Accountability (Index) 2,75 
2,96 50% 
2,08%   
Rule of Law (Index) 2,71 2,08%   
Government Effectiveness 2,54 2,08%   
Judicial Independence (Index) 3,83 2,08%   
Commitment to address economic 
challenges and service debt 
Government capacity and willingness to act in 
response to economic and financial challenges  
5,00 5,00 50% 8,33%   
 
